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Abstract—
In order to reduce signalling, traders may resort to limiting
access to dark venues and imposing limits on minimum
fill sizes they are willing to trade. However, doing this also
restricts the liquidity available to the trader since an ever
increasing quantity of orders are traded by algos in clips
(small sized trades). An alternative is to attempt to monitor
signalling in real time and dynamically make adjustments
to the dark liquidity accessed.
In practice, price slippage against the order is com-
monly taken as an indication of signalling. However,
estimating slippage is difficult and requires a large number
of fills to reliably detect it. Ultimately, even if detected, it
fails to capture an important element of causality between
dark fills and lit prints - a signature of information leakage.
In the extreme, this can lead to scaling back trading at
a time when slippage is caused by a competing trader
consuming liquidity, and the appropriate action would be
to scale trading up – not down – in order to capture good
prices.
In this paper we describe a methodology aimed to
address this dichotomy of trading objectives, allowing to
maximally capture available liquidity while at the same
time protecting the trader from excessive signalling. The
method is designed to profile dark liquidity in a dynamic
fashion, on a per fill basis, in contrast to historical venue
analyses based on estimated slippage. This allows for a
dynamic and real-time control of the desired liquidity
exposure.
The method aims to detect signalling in a more direct
fashion than by estimating slippage, which is a conse-
quence of signalling in certain circumstances only. This
we propose to do by measuring the time between the dark
fill and the next lit print. This duration is then contrasted
with the background lit trading activity at the time in order
to quantify the surprise factor of the lit trade timing. The
intuition is that dark fills, quickly followed by lit prints
are leaking information and likely triggering the lit trading
activity – opposite to what quality dark liquidity should
be.
An empirical validation of this approach reveals that
dark fills quickly followed by lit trades – quantified by
this methodology to be an indication of signalling – suffer
about 3 times higher post fill slippage than dark fills for
which there is no evidence of signalling. In terms of algo
performance, in as realistic a setting as a backtest allows,
the methodology results in around a 30% improvement
in average slippage value for dark only executions. The
additional real benefit is also an increased access to
liquidity, which is difficult to quantify in a backtest.
I. INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of dark trading venues has in
part been driven by the contrasting desires of traders
to maximise liquidity access, while at the same
time minimising information of their full trading
intention leaking to other market participants. This
led to the practice of profiling dark pools by the
”quality” of liquidity available. The property sought
is the ability to trade large quantities with minimal
price impact, i.e., to match large opposing orders
without visibility to the lit market, until after the
deal has been done. While matching in size may
still be the ideal, the proliferation of algo executions
like VWAP or TWAP1 meant that the liquidity of
large opposing orders may also have to be accessed
in multiple small fills.
The main problem for traders is that among the
small slices of VWAPs and TWAPs, information
seeking liquidity may be interspersed, which often
does not represent a genuine trading intent. On the
contrary, by filling a small size in a dark venue, the
liquidity provider learns about large orders trading
and can position their own books appropriately to
profit from the knowledge. This, more often then
not, has an effect similar to front running and causes
additional market impact. When filled against these
information seeking orders, traders will systemati-
cally suffer the consequences of information leak-
ing.
In order to avoid or limit this kind of signalling, it
is not uncommon for traders to require a minimum
fill quantity to their dark orders as filling larger sizes
usually proves too costly for information seeking
liquidity providers. Rough estimates reveal that dark
fills in sizes up to £5,000 on average suffer around
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21bp in 5 second post fill slippage. This however
reduces to zero for fill sizes larger than £30,000.2
However, requiring a minimum fill size in a
non-discriminatory fashion can significantly reduce
available liquidity. An opposing VWAP algo order,
for example, will be sliced into multiple small trades
in order to best track the benchmark. Imposing
a minimum fill size will prevent the trader from
accessing the liquidity offered by this algo order
altogether.
The objective, therefore, is to maximise access to
and trading with genuine liquidity, while limiting
interaction with information seeking liquidity. The
challenge is that it is difficult to distinguish between
the two types of liquidity and as a result defensively
limiting one’s access to liquidity.
Given the intricacies and complexity of today’s
liquidity landscape, the answer most likely isn’t as
simple as historical profiling and restricting access
to only a small subset of venues. Neither is it to
impose an overall minimum fill size based on a
historical analysis. Both of these approaches are
static in nature and are ill suited to dynamically
react to the changing composition of liquidity.
As traders enter and exit the market, the instan-
taneously available liquidity on each venue changes
– it is not a static market property. The appropriate
mechanism by which a dark liquidity trader seeks
trading counterparts should therefore also be a dy-
namic process. With each fill, the trader needs to
assess the type of liquidity they are interacting with
and make dynamical routing decisions to maximise
fill rates and minimise information leakage.
Market structure changes due to MiFID II regula-
tion will most likely only exacerbate the problems,
making it all too important to have a methodology
in place to properly interact with changing liquid-
ity – discriminating between venues with different
mechanisms and dynamically in time.
II. PROFILING VIA POST TRADE SLIPPAGE
A common way of dynamically evaluating liquid-
ity is to measure average post trade price slippage.3
This is typically done by computing the post fill
signed price move at an appropriate time horizon
τ (usually short), and then potentially grouping the
2Calculations based on Barclays dark fills in 2016.
3Interchangeably, terms like impact, slippage, decay, reversion, are
all used to describe it.
fills by venue or size bucket, arrive to an average
slippage value per group. In other words, it is the
average price move, conditional to the sign and time
of the fill
R(τ) = E [t · (pt+τ − pt)|t] . (1)
Here E[·] denotes averaging over the fills at times
t, τ is the short term horizon of interest, pt the log
mid price at time t, and t the buy-sell indicator (-1
for a sell, +1 for a buy) of the fill at time t.
A difficulty with this approach in practice lies
with the fact that fairly long fill histories need
to be traded in order to reliably determine the
existence or lack of slippage. This precludes the
metric from being reactive – and as a consequence
not very useful in practice. If we are able to detect
that the liquidity we interacted with was leaking
information only after the interaction, we cannot use
this knowledge to dynamically react with the aim of
reducing signalling and improving performance.
The reason why estimating slippage in practice
requires many fills lies in the relative magnitudes of
the slippage and price return variance. In order to
reliably ascertain that R(τ) is different from zero,
implying the existence of systematic price move-
ment following a fill, a t-test is commonly used.
This entails comparing the mean price slippage post
fill µ to the standard deviation of unconditional price
returns σ. The fact that the mean grows linearly with
the number of fills T , while the standard deviation
as a square root, imposes a lower bound on the
number of data points required to detect significance
as
Tµ√
Tσ
= 1 (2)
which, solving for T , becomes
√
T =
1
µ/σ
(3)
Interpreting this as the time required to detect a
signal of slippage in a noisy market environment,
the minimum time is at least equal to (σ/µ)2 or
1/Sharpe2 [5]. The smaller the Sharpe ratio, the
longer it will take to significantly detect a signal
of slippage, and detecting a half as strong signal
takes four times longer.
Making things further difficult is that this low
bound assumes an unrealistic 100% trade participa-
tion rate, with a fill at each market price change.
3With a more realistic participation rate things get
worse. A back of an envelope calculation reveals
that in typical circumstances hundreds of fills are
required to statistically detect slippage. A typical
order of magnitude for impact per fill is µ = 0.5bp
(basis points, see Fig 1), while price return standard
deviation per return is about σ1 = 3bp. Rough
estimates from market data reveal that there are
about 3 quote returns per trade.4 Trading an order
at 20% participation, we would roughly expect to
receive a fill for each 5 market trades, corresponding
to 3 · 5 = 15 quote returns. The standard deviation
of market returns at this time horizon is σ15 =
σ1
√
15 ∼ 12bp. Plugging these rough numbers into
the above expression for the minimum number of
fills required to statistically detect slippage we get
T =
1
(µ/σ15)2
=
(
12
0.5
)2
∼ 570 fills. (4)
Practically speaking, a trader needs to receive
hundreds or more fills before they can reliably
determine that the fills are causing slippage. Any
execution with less than this number of fills does
not result in a sufficient number of data points that
would make it possible to reliably detect potential
slippage it may be causing, and in time to make any
reactive adjustments to the execution.
As a consequence, dynamic executions that moni-
tor slippage in practice tend to react more to random
price drifts than to signalling, simply because there
hasn’t elapsed enough time for the sufficient number
of fills to be collected in order to reliably detect
signalling.
An altogether different issue with slippage, but
conceptually possibly a more important one, is that
slippage may, or may not, be an indication of
signalling. This is important because, if the slippage
is not caused by the dark fill signalling, it is more
likely an indication of increased trading pressure
from the same side as the dark order. Arguably,
pulling back trading in order to reduce slippage,
not only will it fail to reduce slippage (because it
is not causing it), it will also fail to capture good
available prices, losing out on the opportunity to
trade at favourable prices.
Misattributing observed slippage to own dark
fills, when in fact slippage may, at best, be ran-
dom market fluctuation, or at worst, caused by a
4These rough values are based on Lloyds Bank (LLOY) data in
London on March 10th 2017.
competing trader consuming the available liquidity,
may result with the trader scaling their trading back
at a time when they should arguably scale it up
to capture good prices in an escaping market. The
consequence, of course, will be inferior average
performance of dark orders.
III. DETECTING DARK FILL SIGNALLING
The methodology we present here addresses the
aforementioned shortcomings of using slippage to
dynamically improve dark liquidity trading.
On the one hand, it attempts to directly address
the question if the dark fills are causing information
leakage – the answer to which provides the basis for
a sound decision to scale trading up or down.
On the other hand, the methodology uses the
valuable data generated by each fill in a statistically
efficiently manner. In this way the trader does not
have to wait long to amass the evidence for leakage.
Each fill, while bringing in valuable information, is
at the same time potentially costly and detrimental
to the overall performance. Detecting leakage with
only a small set of fills makes the methodology
practically relevant and cost effective.
The basic presumption is that trades in the lit
market, quickly following a fill in the dark are
indicative of information leakage. Intuitively speak-
ing, by filling in a dark venue, the trader does not
expect to see trade prints in the lit markets, barring
from the usual background lit trading activity at the
time. Each lit trade following a dark fill therefore
carries with it a ”surprise” factor – or a lack of it.
For example, it would be surprising to observe a
lit print, say 10ms, just after we’ve received a dark
fill if the usual trading activity at the time was one
print each second on average. It would, conversely,
not be a surprise if the next lit print happens half a
second after the dark fill.
Extremely short time periods between the dark
fill and lit print, also captured by this methodology,
are also indicative of the Dark-lit sweep orders
available on many trading platforms. It is obviously
not very advantageous to fill passive dark orders
against dark-lit sweeps because of the immediate
impact they generate.
Finally, in the same spirit as the surprise with
lit prints following a dark fill, lit prints immediately
preceding a dark fill can be indicative of being filled
at latent prices. Again, good reason to avoid being
4filled on such venues, or against latency sensitive
liquidity.
The direction (buy or sell) of the lit prints in
relation to the dark fill, depending on the decision
of the trader may, or may not, play a role.
Dark fills causing lit prints in the same direction
may indicate that the dark order is being front
run by the dark fill counterpart. The appropriate
actions, arguably, would be to scale the trading back,
increase the minimum required fill size, or move the
dark trading to a different venue altogether.
If the caused trades are in the opposite direction,
as would be observed from a Dark-lit sweep, ar-
guably the trading should be scaled back as well.
Dark-lit sweeps may be indicative of opposing or-
ders and by scaling back trading and waiting, the
trader may be able to capture better prices later, after
the opposing orders have caused market impact.
Alternatively, there may be circumstances where the
trader may choose to increase the trading rate to
complete the order quicker.
Whichever the case may be, having the full
information of causality and the relative direction of
lit and dark trades, sheds light on the dark liquidity
a trader is interacting with and allows for the most
appropriate trading decision to be made.
As mentioned, a dark fill immediately preceded
by or quickly followed by lit prints is surprising,
with the surprise factor determined by looking at
the typical lit market trade rate around the time of
the dark fill in question.
Obviously, based on only one surprising dark
fill, we can not make a reliable judgment about
signalling. The lit market print could have by chance
occurred just after a dark fill. However, upon re-
ceiving a number of such surprising fills, we can
with a degree of certainty determine that there may
be information leakage caused by the fills and take
appropriate action.
The number of surprising fills required to reliably
detect signalling is determined by the level of sur-
prise each fill brings. The more surprising fill and lit
trade timings are, the less fills we need to determine
signalling.
IV. FISHER CAUSALITY METRIC
The methodology rests on the assumption that
lit market prints are a Poisson point process with
dynamic intensity. This means that trades arrive
randomly in time with a rate 1/λ(t). This assump-
tion can be relaxed by using Hawkes self exciting
processes in place of the Poisson, but in our view,
the dynamic Poisson process, together with a careful
preparation of the data is quite sufficient for the
purpose.5
For a Poisson process the time durations between
trades are distributed as an exponential density
1/λ · e−t/λ, i.e., the probability for a market trade
to happen with a duration time less than δ is
P (δ) =
1
λ
∫ δ
0
e−t/λdt = 1− e−δ/λ. (5)
If a dark fill happens at a random time, the
duration between the fill and the next lit market print
is also a Poisson process with the same rate λ(t).
The reason for this is somewhat counter-intuitive
(indeed, there is a “waiting paradox” named after it)
and is due to the memory-less property of a Poisson
process.
For a dark fill we can estimate the likelihood
(surprise) of the duration between the fill and the
next lit trade under the locally estimated Poisson
intensity. Having observed n lit market durations
we need a probability density function for the next
predicted print duration. This is done via a plug-
in distribution, which we construct by plugging in
an appropriate estimate of the intensity λˆ into the
exponential density function
p(δn+1|λˆ) = 1
λˆ
e−δn+1/λˆ. (6)
In order to take into account the reliability of
the local intensity estimate (which is influenced
by how many lit trades prior to the dark fill are
used to estimate the intensity, and the variability
of durations) we can use a Bayesian approach. In
this case, a Bayesian posterior distribution using an
information-less objective prior 1/λ is
p(δn+1|δ1, δ2, ..., δn) = n
n+1δ¯n
(nδ¯ + δn+1)n+1
, (7)
where δ¯ is the mean duration. In a frequentist’s
world, this expression is also a probability function
5Estimating the local Poisson rate with only a small number of
recent market trades, results in the estimate being very dynamic,
alleviating concerns that market prints are not well represented by an
i.i.d. process. Furthermore, the flip side of using a small number of
data points is compensated by the repeated nature of the experiment
corresponding to the multiple dark fills.
5obtained by maximising the joint likelihood function
from which λˆ was eliminated [1], [2], [3].
Analogously to Eq. 5, the probability of observ-
ing a duration δn+1 having previously observed n
durations is obtained by integrating
P (δn+1) =
∫ δn+1
0
p(δ|δ1, δ2, ..., δn)dδ
= 1−
(
nδ¯
)n(
nδ¯ + δn+1
)n (8)
In the context of our problem, δn+1 is the duration
between the dark fill and the next lit market print,
while the previous n durations (δ1, δ2, ..., δn) are lit
market durations.
More important for this application is one mi-
nus the probability 1 − P (δn+1), which can be
understood as the p-value of the test that the δn+1
duration is consistent with the estimated local Pois-
son process, i.e., that duration δn+1 was generated
by the same Poisson process that generated the
previous n durations. As with any p-test, low values
are considered as evidence against the hypothesis,
in this case that the post dark fill duration was
consistent with background market activity at the
time. In other words, a dark fill quickly followed
by lit trading activity and resulting with a p-value
of, say, 0.01, we would expect to happen by chance
in less than 1 out of 100 cases. It is more likely that
the lit trades were triggered by the dark fill.
Figure 1 shows the empirical relation between the
average dark fill slippage and signalling evidence
as quantified by the p-value of the described test.
On the y-axis, the average 5 second slippage is
computed as a function of the bucketed p-value
on the x-axis. As can be seen, x-axis values close
to zero, corresponding to significant signalling ev-
idence have a threefold higher post fill adverse
price move than fills which carry no evidence of
signalling. Slippage is computed by averaging the
signed price return 5 seconds after in each bucket.
To use this method in practice, however, we can
not rely on a large number of fills required to
compute the above averages. To be applicable in a
reactive setting and inform the trader to dynamically
tailor liquidity exposure, the methodology needs to
discriminate liquidity with only a few fills done.
Each fill with undesired liquidity is potentially
costly, and we need to make the best use of the
important evidence each fill brings.
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Fig. 1. Dark fill slippage is significantly higher for fills quickly
followed by lit prints. Chart shows the average dark fill slippage as
a function of the likelihood of signalling as described in the text.
Slippage, measured as the 5 second post fill signed price move,
increases with the ”surprise factor” in the timing of the lit prints
following the dark fill. The surprise is measured by the p-value of
the test described in the text and is equal to 1 minus the likelihood
(probability) that the next lit trade following the dark fill has a
duration consistent with previous lit market activity, i.e., that its
timing is not unusual in the context of market activity at the time.
We can see that the fills which have a high surprise factor, or high
likelihood of signalling (values on the x-axis close to zero), have a
significantly higher average slippage than fills with a low likelihood
of signalling (x-axis values towards one).
Data from start of April to end of October 2016. Dark fills executed by Barclays Hydra dark only
strategy in 100 London Stock Exchange (LSE) names selected by the most number of executed fills
by Barclays. LSE market data used from Reuters.
Obviously, a single dark fill with surprising fol-
lowing lit print timing does not quite constitute reli-
able evidence of signalling, and most likely should
not be reacted to. But once the trader receives a few
fills from a venue, they should be able to reliably
understand the quality of the liquidity trading on the
venue at the moment, and decide whether they want
to maintain or modify access to the venue.
To quantitatively do this, we need to efficiently
merge the evidence collected by the k previously
traded fills in such a way that, even if each of the
k fills taken in isolation does not carry evidence of
signalling, when considered together as a sequence
of events, we can establish the overall likelihood of
signalling.
To this end, we can make use of the Fisher’s
method [4] for repeated experiments, which consists
of recognising that the log sum of uniform random
variables (which p-values are) is distributed accord-
ing to a Chi-squared distribution with 2k degrees of
6freedom
− 2
k∑
i=1
log(pi) ∼ χ22k. (9)
Therefore for each group of k dark fills, by
computing the above sum, we can read off from
Chi-squared the likelihood that the dark fills are
leaking information and are detrimental to the order
execution. In other words, each fill from, say a
particular exchange, can be thought of as an ex-
periment bringing in the valuable information about
the liquidity available to the trader on the venue at
the time. By using Fisher’s method, they optimally
use this information, allowing to quickly accumu-
late evidence of potential leakage and appropriately
adjust their liquidity exposure.
Once a trader observes a few fills from a venue
which indicate there is information leakage, the
trader may in the extreme avoid filling on the
venue, but more likely may impose a minimum
fill size for the venue. That this is an effective
strategy can be seen in figure 2 in which we show
that dark fills restricted to large sizes indeed do
show significantly less signalling and information
leakage. Based on a sample of Barclays dark venue
fills, the chart’s y-axis shows the percentage of dark
fills with signalling evidence that have a fill size
greater than the x-axis GBP size threshold. Evidence
of signalling is determined by the timing of lit
prints following the dark fill and the test p-value
being smaller than 0.05. Only about 20% of dark
fills larger than £30,000 are quickly followed by lit
market prints, indicating signalling. In comparison,
almost 50% of dark fills when unrestricted in fill
size are quickly followed by lit trades. Curiously,
increasing minimum fill size beyond about £30,000
does not seem to reduce signalling. Its effect at that
point is only to reduce the available liquidity a trader
is interacting with.
Providing an estimate on the expected real world
execution improvements of this methodology is dif-
ficult. However, a crude way to assess the statistical
and practical power of the test may be done using
Barclays algo execution data. The data used is from
algos trading only in dark venues (Hydra dark only)
from start of April to end of October 2016. The
analysed symbols were restricted to a set of 100
London Stock Exchange names selected by the most
number of executed fills by Barclays.
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Fig. 2. Requiring a minimum fill size on dark fills significantly
reduces signalling risk – however, it also reduces liquidity
exposure. The y-axis displays the percentage of dark fills in our
sample for which there is evidence of signalling to the lit markets.
On the x-axis we show how these percentages might change if a
minimum dark fill size is imposed. We can see that by limiting fills
to be larger than £25,000 we substantially reduce the percentage
of signalling dark fills. However, as emphasized in the text, doing
this also significantly reduces the liquidity available to the trader.
Signalling risk is estimated by measuring the time difference between
the dark fill and the next print in the lit markets, and comparing this
duration with the background lit market activity at the time.
Data from start of April to end of October 2016. Dark fills executed by Barclays Hydra dark only
strategy in 100 London Stock Exchange (LSE) names selected by the most number of executed fills
by Barclays. LSE market data used from Reuters.
We furthermore limit the analysis to algo exe-
cutions requiring more than 15 fills to complete
and use the arrival price slippage6 as a comparison
metric. The possible increased liquidity exposure
this methodology allows can not be tested using
historical data.
In order to be realistic, for each algo execution we
compute the likelihood of signalling (using Fisher’s
method) using only the first 5 fills of an order
execution, irrespectively of the total number of fills
an order eventually generated. The reason for using
only a few initial fills is that in practice we would
normally change the algo behaviour upon detecting
potential signalling. We find that algo executions
with substantial signalling risk – determined by the
p-value arising from Eq. 9 at the 5% level – have
roughly 30% higher absolute slippage values than
6Arrival price slippage is the order signed difference between the
volume weighted average order price and the arrival mid price. We
proxy the arrival mid price by the first fill of the order, which being
a dark order is almost always the mid price.
7executions for which we do not find evidence of
signalling risk.
V. CONCLUSION
Dark liquidity in equities markets today is not
fully dark, allowing for fills with negligible market
impact. It may better be described by shades of
gray, with different signalling risks associated with
different types of liquidity. Clips of large algo
executions will be interspersed with information
seeking orders, making it difficult to distinguish
between the two.
Furthermore, liquidity principally is dynamic in
nature, its composition constantly changing with
traders entering and exiting the market, working
their orders.
Simple static methods, such as requiring a mini-
mum fill size, while effective at reducing signalling,
also result in a significantly reduced access to liq-
uidity as interaction with algo orders is limited.
Dynamical methods based on estimating slippage
are not a viable option either. Too many fills are
required to reliably detect slippage for it to be
usable in a setting where reactivity is required. As
a consequence, methods that monitor slippage are
more likely reacting to random market fluctuations
than signalling.
On the other hand, slippage, if at all detectable, is
not a sufficient piece of information for a trader to
react in a meaningful way. If the slippage is not
caused by the trader’s fills, the reaction to scale
trading back is quite the opposite to what a mean-
ingful response would be. Observing slippage that
is not caused by own orders may be an indication
of competing traders for the available liquidity and
trading should be scaled up, not down.
The method we describe in this paper colours the
dark liquidity by dynamically detecting evidence of
causality between dark and lit fills and provides
reactive information for a trader to adjust their
trading. It is based on monitoring unusual timing
synchronicity of dark and lit fills, which for a fully
dark venue should not be present.
Using this method, a trader does not need to re-
strict access to liquidity at the start of an execution;
on the contrary, they can target dark liquidity in
all sizes and venues. As fills are generated, more
and more evidence is accumulated, coloring the
gray liquidity, and allowing the trader to reactively
and dynamically restrict access to venues and sizes
which, at the time, they do not wish to interact
with. Depending on the amount of evidence each fill
brings in, different number of fills will be required
to color the liquidity – in the extreme cases, two
to three fills may be sufficient information to pull
back from accessing certain liquidity, protecting the
trader.
This method can easily be extended to include
other relevant lit market events (e.g. quote changes)
and analyse their relation to dark fill timings. Ulti-
mately the method applies naturally to market trades
in multiple venues (not only dark) provided it is
possible to exclude own fills from trade print feeds.
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